Case Law Update March 2026
Updated 3-27-26
Estes v. Palm Beach County School Dist./Davies Claims,___ So.3d ___ (Fla. 1st DCA 3/23/26)
Statute of Limitations
Bill Rogner
***HR Law will be filing a Motion to Certify a Question of Great Public Importance with the Florida Supreme Court relating to the DCA’s interpretation of tolling and the unintended extension of the SOL*****
In a 52-page en banc decision, the court eliminated the “2yr/1yr” analysis employed for the last 25 years to determine whether or not a PFB is time-barred under the statute. The claimant’s DOA was 9/30/21, with the last date of authorized medical occurring on 1/26/23. The E/C asserted her 6/13/24 PFB was time-barred, as the SOL would have run on 1/26/24. The underlying JCC determined the claimant’s PFB was time-barred under F.S. 440.192(2) and prior case law. The Order further determined her PFB sought compensability, to which that subsection does not apply. The court analyzed the statutory and case law history of the SOL in workers’ compensation and the inclusion of the language in sub-paragraph (2) that obtaining authorized medical benefits “…shall toll the limitations period …for 1 year from the date of such payment…”. After analyzing the term “toll” in various prior cases and scenarios and deeming prior 1st DCA cases deficient in failing to interpret the term, the DCA held that the plain meaning of the statute supported the claimant’s view. They held that because benefits had been provided shortly after her accident, and for sixteen months thereafter, those benefits tolled the two-year statute, until one year after the E/C furnished the last benefit. According to the DCA, the two-year statute did not even begin to run until the expiration of the separate one-year clock, which would have been January of 2024 at the soonest. Judges Bilbrey and Thomas wrote lengthy dissents. Click here to view Opinion
Ok, so how do I figure out the SOL now?
Scenario #1 – No benefits ever paid/provided. The claimant still just has two years from the date of accident to timely file a PFB.
Scenario #2 – Benefits provided. There is now a two-year bank of time (730 days) before the SOL runs. You count down from this bank every time the claimant goes a year without treatment.
Ex. – If DOA is 1/1/22, but the claimant treated at least once a year through 11/29/24, the one-year tolling period ended on 11/28/25, so the two-year bank of time starts going down on 11/29/25.
If the claimant returns to the authorized doctor on 12/9/25, only 10 days come off of the 730-day bank of time (11/29 -12/8/25).
The claimant has a remaining 720 days in the bank from that date before the SOL will run.
Please call HR Law if you would like to examine/discuss any specific scenarios.
Purple Pride, Inc. / First Protective Ins. Co. v. Burgess, ___ So.3d ___ (Fla. 1st DCA 3/18/2026)
Medical Benefits / Medically Necessary Travel Bill Rogner
| The DCA set aside the JCC’s Order which required the E/C to pay for the costs of attendant care providers and DME for the quadriplegic claimant’s trip to visit family in New York. Although the JCC rejected the psychotherapist’s testimony that such a trip was “medically necessary” because it would improve claimant’s depression and anxiety symptoms, he still concluded the additional costs the claimant would incur while traveling should be paid by the E/C. The DCA noted that in analyzing what constitutes medically necessary travel expenses, prior cases rejected additional medical benefits for non-medically required travel to New York, and “quality of life” travel (to movies, grocery store, the mall, the park, mother’s home and even a father’s funeral). Such travel is “gratuitous and not compensable.” They found that the trip to New York was not medically necessary, and – at best – a quality-of-life excursion. As such travel is not included in the statute, it was error to order the E/C to pay for such. As the Order was set aside on these grounds, the opinion did not address the E/C’s first argument that the JCC could not order them to pay the claimant directly for the requested costs. They also noted the claimant’s cross-appeal on constitutional grounds was meritless, and a concurring opinion additionally noted that the claimant’s alleged constitutional challenge was invalid by virtue of failing to file and serve a notice of constitutional challenge as required by Fl.R. App. P. 9.425. Click here to view Opinion |