Case Law Update March 2021
Updated 3-26-21
Ali v. American Airlines and Sedgwick CMS, (Fla. 1st DCA 3/17/2021) Award of Fees/Costs The claimant filed three PFBs and the E/C provided the benefits within the 30 days. Claimant sought attorney’s fees and costs related to the PFBs but the JCC denied the request. The DCA reversed the JCC’s Order, holding that the claimant was the prevailing party because the benefits were provided after the filing of the PFBs. Therefore, the claimant was entitled to an award of costs. The DCA further stated that attorney’s fees and costs incurred in obtaining an award of costs may also be awarded. Click here to view Opinion Scott v. James Jones Const & Central FL Siding Pros/Norguard, SEPL/Lion Ins./Packard, Nobles American, (Fla. 1st DCA 3/16/21) Coverage/Coverage by Estoppel Bill Rogner The claimant was seriously injured on 4/24/17 (ultimately resulting in amputation) on a construction site, where multiple parties were engaged in work. Ultimately, the JCC determined that the claimant was an employee of Central Florida Siding Pros (CFSP), as subcontractor, and statutorily employed by James Jones Construction, neither of whom had coverage. The claimant and Jones appealed multiple issues, only one of which the DCA addressed, finding the other issues (included that of Bill’s client Southeast) without merit. The DCA rejected arguments that (1) claimant should have been covered under CFSP’s policy with Norguard, as it had allegedly been improperly cancelled, or (2) that Norguard should have been estopped from denying coverage based upon promissory estoppel. In regard to the first argument the claimant asserted that because Norguard issued a notice of cancellation for non-payment effective 2/10/18, but then issued a certificate of insurance (COI) to Jones, stating the policy would be in effect until 4/29/17, it was not properly cancelled. The claimant further argued that because the cancellation notice purportedly gave CFSP the opportunity to pay unpaid premium, this was a condition precedent that was not met. The DCA rejected that theory, as cancellation was not expressly conditioned on a second nonpayment. The only condition precedent was a ten-day mailing requirement that Norguard fulfilled. In regard to promissory estoppel, the elements are (1) a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance, (2) action or forbearance in reliance on the promise, and (3) injustice resulting if the promise is not enforced. Although the DCA noted claimant and Jones’ assertion was technically correct, they found the Florida Supreme Court has also required that the reasonableness of the promisee’s reliance may be analyzed. Because the COI contained disclaimers that it was for “informational purposes only” and Jones was familiar with such disclaimers, the finding of reasonable reliance was supported by competent, substantial evidence. The DCA found case law Atlantic Masonry v. Miller Construction, 558 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), and Criterion Leasing Group v. Gulf Coast Plastering & Drywall, 582 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) asserted by the claimant and Jones inapplicable to the COI at hand. Click here to view Opinion Colon V. City of Riviera Beach, (Fla. 4th DCA 3/10/21) General Releases/Enforceability The 4th DCA affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant city. The plaintiff sued the city for violations of the Florida Civil Rights Act. The trial court determined that a release signed by appellant in connection with a settlement of a worker’s compensation claim which expressly released the City from any claim alleging discrimination was “plain, unambiguous and binding under state law.” The DCA rejected the argument that they should apply federal law to determine whether the release barred the claim. Although a Florida statute, like FCRA, is to be given the same construction as federal courts would give the federal act after which FCRA was patterned, the issue in this case was the interpretation of the release, which is governed by state law. Under Florida law, the DCA held the trial court did not err in entering summary judgment based on the unambiguous release. Click here to view Opinion |
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