Case Law Update August 2023
Updated 8-30-23-23
| Francois v. JFK Med.Ctr.Ltd.,___ So.3d ____(Fla. 4th DCA 8/30/23) 440.205 Retaliation/Evidence The DCA affirmed the Circuit Court’s granting summary judgment to the employer. The employee alleged his termination was due to his filing a workers’ compensation claim, and that the employer’s alleged grounds (that he used excessive force on a patient) were pre-textual. The trial court applied the business judgment rule, which prohibits courts from second-guessing the business judgment of employers, making the only relevant inquiry “whether the employer in good faith believed that the employee had engaged in the conduct that led the employer to discipline the employee.” Here, for summary judgment, the employee had to show that the employer did not honestly believe their alleged legitimate grounds for firing him. The employee failed to present such evidence. Click here to view Opinion Normandy Insurance Co. v. Bouayad, ___So.3d___(Fla. 1st DCA 8/16/23) Bill Rogner Compensability/Arising out of Sixteen months after the oral argument held at the Workers’ Compensation Forum in 2022, the First DCA finally issued its opinion in this case. It reversed the JCC and ruled that the claimant’s injuries were not compensable. The claimant was shot multiple times while at work. Although seriously injured, he survived his wounds and filed for workers’ compensation benefits. On the night of the shooting, he identified “Robert” as the assailant, but later recanted, instead asserting that the shooting was work-related. Aside from testimony suggesting that the workplace was in a high-risk area, he presented no evidence that the shooting related to his employment aside from mere presence at the workplace. The JCC found that the most likely cause of the shooting was a workplace dispute or a disgruntled employee, although no evidence supported that conclusion. Nonetheless, the JCC ruled the shooting compensable, and the E/C appealed. The court reversed, ruling that there was “no causal link between the injuries claimant suffered in the shooting and the work he performed. The only work activity performed by claimant at the time of the shooting was walking while carrying a rental agreement. The identity of the shooter was unestablished, his motive was unknown, and no evidence connected the shooter to the work claimant performed for his employer.” Since the claimant failed to prove that the shooting was caused by the work he performed for his employer, the injuries were not compensable. One judge dissented and the court also certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court, so stay tuned. Click here to view Opinion North Collier Fire Control and Rescue/PGCS v. Harlem, ___So.3d___(Fla. 1st DCA 8/9/2023) First Responder Presumption/Heart Disease In a lengthy opinion, the DCA reversed the JCC’s Order which found the claimant firefighter’s thoracic aortic aneurysm fit within the meaning of “heart disease,” applied the presumption as to causation rejected the employer’s effort to rebut the presumption and found the aortic aneurysm compensable under F.S. s. 112.18. That subsection presumes a firefighter’s condition or impairment of health is presumed to be compensable if the condition or impairment was caused by tuberculosis, heart disease or hypertension. The E/C argued the claimant’s aneurism in the aorta (the artery leading into the heart) did not fit the definition of “heart disease” in section 112, and as the claimant relied solely on the presumption and presented no evidence of work causation of the aneurysm, and there was no evidence at all presented regarding its etiology. The DCA noted that although the JCC relied on the DCA’s prior decision in City of Venice v. Van Dyke (“…the ascending aorta is one of the structures of the heart”), they noted that decision was limited to its facts and that panel relied on an assumption of a diagram of the heart without further analysis. Without the presumption or any evidence of occupational causation of the aortic aneurysm, the DCA was constrained to reverse. The dissent argued Van Dyke controlled, as did Florida Supreme Court precedent, and that the majority’s use of “1960s dictionaries” shifts core medical analysis from doctors to lawyers and judges. The dissent urged that these deficiencies require en banc review. Click here to view Opinion |